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IntroductIon
On June 1, 1997, Irish actor Gabriel Byrne read a state-
ment from newly elected British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. The statement was presented at a festival in Mill-
street, County Cork, Ireland, commemorating the 150th 
anniversary of the Irish Potato Famine (The Irish Times, 2 
June 1997, p. 1). In that declaration, Prime Minister Blair 
expressed remorse for Britain’s failure to offer greater as-
sistance during the famine where over one million died 
and hundreds of thousands more were displaced. The 
Potato Famine is a major event in Anglo-Irish history 
and a defining episode in constructing Irish identity and 
Anglo-Irish relations.
Blair’s statement was met with wide acclaim. Nicholas 
Watt called his contrition greatly “significant”, which was 
meant “to heal one of the greatest wounds in Anglo-Irish 
history” (Watt, 1997, p. 21). Additionally, it was read “as a 
signal of the government’s genuine desire not only to inject 
fresh momentum into the peace process but also to ensure 
complete unity with whoever is in office in Dublin” (Wal-
len, 1997, p. A7). However, Blair was criticized for apol-
ogizing for events 150 years in the past where there was 
historical disagreement regarding British responsibility 
for the famine (Wallen, 1997, p. A7). According to Blair’s 
critics, the apology created an expectation that more mea 
culpas may be presented from 10 Downing Street for 
past British injustices. Ultimately, Blair’s apology can be 
read as a bold political move bringing opportunities and 
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challenges for British politics, questions regarding citizen-
ship, and the Northern Ireland peace process.
We focused on Tony Blair’s apology for three reasons. 
First, Blair’s rhetoric was one of the first examples of a col-
lective apology issued by a post-Cold War era political. It 
is continually referenced in newspaper accounts of other 
apologies, but little scholarly work on this statement had 
been done (for exceptions, see Cunningham, 2004). Thus, 
we wanted to investigate this oft referenced apology fur-
ther. Also, it was one of the first times a British Prime 
Minister had apologized for historical events, setting a 
precedent that Prime Ministers Brown and Cameron have 
followed and might be followed by future prime ministers. 
Understanding this rhetorical precedent can give us in-
sight into how future British leaders might approach public 
apology. Finally, Blair’s apology serves as an entry point to 
symbolically examine how Anglo-Irish relations improved 
and helped to jumpstart the Northern Ireland peace pro-
cess. In this essay, our purpose is to explain the symbolic 
workings of Blair’s apology and how it laid some important 
groundwork for future reconciliation efforts. 
To that end, we begin with a theoretical discussion of 
what constitutes a political apology (Edwards, 2010). Then, 
we examine Tony Blair’s apology by first laying out the his-
torical and immediate context for such a statement to be 
presented and then analyzing the prime minister’s state-
ment. Next, we briefly assess the reception of Blair’s ad-
dress and expectations that were generated from it. Finally, 
we discuss the connections and/or questions that this essay 
conjures up regarding the literature on political apologies 
and reconciliation.
coLLEctIvE ApoLogIEs
Since the end of the Cold War a number of different po-
litical leaders have apologized for past transgressions. 
Scholars in various disciplines have spoken to their sym-
bolic power. For example, in their edited collection on 
apologies and reconciliation, Elazar Barkan and Alexander 
Karn (2006) asserted apologies can help reconstitute rela-
tionships harmed by historical wrongdoing. Apologies can 
create conditions for forgiveness, while also allowing for 
governments struggling with the past to put painful lega-
cies behind them. Melissa Nobles (2008) described how 
the power of an apology lay in its ability to not only “ratify 
certain public interpretations of history, but also to morally 
judge, assign responsibility, and introduce expectations 
about what acknowledgment of that history requires” 
(p. 2). Danielle Celermajer (2009) maintained apologies 
work to “re-covenant” a nation so it can (re)build its na-
tional polity. Similarly, Lisa Villadsen (2012) argued apolo-
gies can be an important step in “civic reconstruction” as 
different groups try to mend relationships and create a 
common feeling of identity (p. 231). 
Surprisingly, rhetorical studies scholars have not in-
quired deeply to ascertain the generic functions and strat-
egies of this phenomenon. To that end, we synthesized 
observations from other research on apology, examined 
various apologies by political leaders, and built on previ-
ous published work (see Edwards, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 
2009) to create a theory that accounts for the broad func-
tions and rhetorical strategies of this rhetorical genre, col-
lective apologies. These speech acts they function in three 
broad ways. First, collective apologies seek to reconstitute, 
rebuild, and strengthen relationships amongst communi-
ties harmed by historical wrongdoing perpetuated by one 
community against another (Edwards, 2010, p. 62). A col-
lective apology serves as a rhetorical first step in redress-
ing old wounds so collectives may begin building a bridge 
to reconciliation. It is not a panacea and will not heal all 
wounds caused by past transgressions, but it can lay the 
groundwork to shift the relational dynamic between vic-
timizer and victim from animosity to one of conciliation 
and mutual understanding. 
Second, collective apologies, as a form of collective 
memory, function as a revision and reconsideration of 
past events between communities. Collective memory is a 
body of beliefs about the past that helps a public or soci-
ety understand its history, present, and (by implication) its 
future (Bodnar, 1994, p. 76). It involves an interpretation 
of history that can be widely ratified by the general public 
(Browne, 1999; Edy, 1999). By its nature, collective memory 
is selective, partial, and often carefully managed in certain 
ways for strategic purposes (Bostdorff & Goldzwig, 2005; 
Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2000). Accordingly, a collective 
apology serves as a reflection on past, present, and future 
relationships with the victimized collective. These apolo-
gies become lessons about what communities should and 
should not do in their interactions with each other. As such, 
they serve as revisions to the dominant perceptions of his-
tory, signal a new direction in their interaction with an of-
fended group, and seek to reshape the relationship between 
victimizer and victim. Speakers who issue collective apolo-
gies are attempting to face and understand a nation-state’s 
dark past, while immunizing and inoculating that collective 
from making the same mistakes (Yamazaki, 2005, p. 128).
Third, collective apologies provide a rhetorical posi-
tion to reconstruct communal and civic identity. A group’s 
communal and civic identity is, in part, discursively con-
structed through a variety of means such as national an-
thems sung, history that is revered, historical heroes 
celebrated, and many other symbolic activities. Historical 
transgressions can break these symbolic bonds. They put 
one group above another. They serve as impediments to 
all groups believing they are equal in a society. Collec-
tive apologies can begin a rebalancing of the obligations 
different groups have for each other. In one sense, they 
can bring a collective, who may have been ostracized be-
cause of historical transgressions, back into the fold of a 
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community (Edwards & Luckie, 2011). At the same time, 
collective apologies may deleverage power the victimized 
community may have in receiving concessions and repara-
tions from the victimizers. If an apology is presented and 
accepted by a victimized community and that community 
later asks for greater corrective action for historical trans-
gressions committed against them, then it is very possible 
the apologizer will be reluctant to provide further expres-
sion of regret, apology, or reparation of some kind because 
a collective apology has already provided. Consequently, 
collective apologies can begin to re-establish a civic bal-
ance amongst groups or at the very least give victimized 
communities an opportunity for greater success within 
larger societies. At the same time, the power that may come 
with being a victim of historical injustice may be lost be-
cause the society as a whole expects them to participate 
equally and without preference for one group over another. 
The content of a collective apology is composed of 
three primary strategies. First, speakers acknowledge a 
wrong has been committed. Aaron Lazare asserted ac-
knowledging wrongdoing was the most important aspect 
of an apology because failure to be forthcoming can ren-
der the apology’s sentiment suspect (2004, p. 76). In ac-
knowledging wrongdoing, speakers delineate injustices 
committed against their victims. Girma Negash referred 
to this accounting of injustices as “reckoning” (2006, p. 8). 
Reckoning is defined as putting the victimizer’s crimes on 
the historical record in an open and public fashion. By con-
fessing and discussing the atrocities committed, both the 
injurer and injured can take stock of the event in question. 
Additionally, rhetors specify the victims of these injustices. 
Victims of historical wrongdoing are “the ghosts of the past 
that will not remain in their graves until their stories are 
told” (Nytagodien & Neal, 2004, p. 468). Recognizing and 
naming the injured parties gives voice to the “ghosts” of 
the past and their descendants. These victims’ stories are 
finally being discussed. Their history, in some small part, is 
being recovered. Instead of being treated as inferior mem-
bers of the body politic, speakers recognize and give voice 
to their humanity. In acknowledging another person’s hu-
manity, Shriver noted that a speaker “lays the groundwork 
for both the construction and repair of any human com-
munity” (Shriver, 1995, p. 8). 
Mortification is the second element rhetors use in a 
collective apology. According to language theorist Ken-
neth Burke, all human beings, subsequently all communi-
ties, strive to achieve perfection through the social orders 
they build (Burke, 1961, p.3). These orders offer stability. 
However, when that order is disturbed or imperfect it be-
comes a source of pollution or, to use the favored Burkean 
term, guilt. For Burke, guilt serves as the basis of drama in 
social relationships and motivates human behavior. Guilt 
is an undesirable state of affairs that can have a debilitat-
ing impact upon an individual or a society (Brummett, 
1980, p. 68). Consequently, guilt must be expunged. One 
of the ways individuals or communities can expunge guilt 
is through mortification. Mortification involves a form of 
self-sacrifice. The individual or community (often through 
an official representative) makes a symbolic offering to ap-
pease society and repair social order. In a collective apol-
ogy, this symbolic offering is accepting responsibility for 
society’s actions and expressing remorse for the wrongdo-
ing. Through this act, the rhetor purifies the social order, 
allowing redemption to be attained and stability restored. 
Finally, collective apologies contain some form of cor-
rective action. William Benoit (1995) described corrective 
action as the steps a rhetor will take to make sure problems 
do not reoccur (p. 78). These actions seek to start the process 
of repairing relationships between communities. They send 
a signal that the victimizers will be assisting the victimized. 
Additionally, these actions position the two communities 
to forge relationships based on mutual interest and respect. 
prImE mInIstEr BLAIr’s 
ApoLogy for thE IrIsh 
potAto fAmInE
situational context
The Irish Potato Famine was one of the watershed events in 
Irish history and Anglo-Irish relations. It changed Ireland 
in every possible demographic. Originally, the potato was 
grown in Ireland as a crop for its gentry class. In the middle 
of the 18th century, however, the crop became a staple for 
many poor tenant farmers. By the early part of the 19th cen-
tury, potatoes became a staple food for practically everyone 
living in Ireland, particularly the poor. To accommodate 
this new staple crop more and more acreage was dedicated 
to its farming; thereby, increasing Ireland’s reliance on a 
large potato crop to be harvested. It was not only a major 
food source, but was a basis of currency farmers could use 
to pay debts, sell to internal markets, and/or export to vari-
ous parts of the British Empire or other parts of the world 
(Dolan 2002).
From 1801, because of the Act of Union, Ireland was 
directly governed as part of the United Kingdom. Over the 
next 40 years, British leaders struggled with how to gov-
ern Ireland. Irish politicians and its population constantly 
complained of being treated as second-class citizens within 
the Empire (Kinealy, 1995). The government was accused 
of not providing the Irish with enough resources in terms 
of housing, food, employment, revamping property laws 
(many Irish farmers did not own their own land), and sta-
ples to maintain more than subsistence living (Gray 1995). 
Accordingly, prior to the famine many Irish people lived in 
poor conditions, some constantly on the verge of starva-
tion. The famine only exacerbated this dire situation.
Jason A. Edwards and Amber Luckie    British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s…      http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu
E-journal promoted by the Campus for Peace, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
JOURNAL OF CONFLICTOLOGY,  Volume 5, Issue 1 (2014)        ISSN 2013-8857    46
In 1845 the potato harvest within Ireland dropped sig-
nificantly because of potato blight, a fungus affecting the 
potato plant. Basically, this fungus causes the potato to be 
rotten from the inside out making it impossible to con-
sume. In 1845, by autumn, nearly 1/3 to 1/2 of the potato 
crop was affected by the fungus (Donnelly, 2005). By 1846 
nearly 75% of the entire potato crop had been destroyed. 
Because it was a staple food source for many in Ireland the 
potato blight caused immediate and great hardship. The 
British government attempted to respond to the famine by 
obtaining other food stuffs for the island. Prime Minister 
Robert Peel bought maize and cornmeal to be shipped to 
Ireland. However, the foodstuffs sent had not been prop-
erly processed, causing them to be difficult to eat (Kinealy, 
1995). There is also evidence that Ireland produced enough 
food during the famine to feed its people, but much of 
that food (pork, beef, wheat, and other crops) was ex-
ported to other parts of the British Empire and the United 
States, further exacerbating the lack of affordable food for 
the poor (Gallagher, 1987).
Contributing to the crisis was the potato blight put 
many farmers out of work, which hampered their ability 
to generate enough income to afford expensive foods, like 
bread or meat. In view of that, the British government at-
tempted to create a variety of public works jobs that put 
500,000 Irishmen to work. However, the jobs were not 
properly run, there was rampant corruption, and the wages 
paid for those positions was woefully inadequate for the 
employed to buy food they could afford (Lyons, 1973, 
pp. 30-34). In early 1847, Lord John Russell, who replaced 
Peel as Prime Minister, stopped all public works projects 
and food aid, leaving thousands in peril. Although relief 
missions were organized from various parts of the world 
including British charities, the United States, and the Ot-
toman Empire over 1 million people died because of the 
famine and another 1-2 million Irish emigrated to the 
United States, Canada, Australia, or elsewhere. Simply put, 
the Irish Potato Famine changed the landscape of Ireland 
forever and caused severe resentment among many Irish 
toward the British government.
In the 1980s and mid-1990s, Anglo-Irish relations 
improved. As Ireland approached the 150th anniversary of 
the potato famine the Irish opposition leader, soon to be 
prime minister, Bertie Ahearn formally asked the British 
government for a formal apology for its role in exacerbat-
ing the effects of the potato famine (The Irish Times, 2 June 
1997, p. 1). British Prime Minister John Major refused to 
provide an apology, but he had begun to make significant 
overtures to restarting the Northern Ireland peace negotia-
tions, which had been hampered by Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) violence and the unwillingness of national and un-
ionist parties to negotiate a settlement. In May 1997, Tony 
Blair became the first Labor Prime Minister in 18 years. In 
his autobiography, Prime Minister Blair believed his elec-
tion provided a new opportunity to achieve peace within 
Northern Ireland. He came to 10 Downing Street with a 
plan to restart negotiations (Blair, 2010, pp. 153-199). The 
150th anniversary of the potato famine gave the new prime 
minister an opportunity to provide a small gesture that 
could move the dialogue forward. It was a message to the 
Irish “that he was leading a very modern British govern-
ment that was keen to deal with Ireland, north and south, 
in an even-handed manner free from the shackles of the 
past” (Wintour & Watt, 2012, para. 14). Subsequently, Blair 
became the first British Prime Minister to express any pub-
lic contrition for this event (Marks, 1997, p. 2). Blair apolo-
gized for the past to begin a better present and future.
prime minister Blair’s “Apology”
Through the voice of Irish actor Gabriel Byrne, Blair’s state-
ment began with the traditional pleasantries toward his au-
dience. Then in his first substantive sentences he reflected 
on the impact of the Irish Potato Famine. Blair stated, “the 
Famine was a defining event in the history of Ireland and 
of Britain. It has left deep scars. That one million people 
should have died in what was then part of the richest and 
most powerful nation in the world is something that still 
causes pain as we reflect on it today” (Blair, 1997). These 
initial sentences constituted Blair’s acknowledgement. He 
noted the Potato Famine was a “defining event” in the 
history of Anglo-Irish relations. He identified that there 
were over “one million” victims as part of this historical 
event. Consequently, the Famine within “the richest and 
most powerful nation in the world” has left “deep scars” 
that continued to impede Anglo-Irish relations. Implic-
itly, Blair’s acknowledgement of the Potato Famine sent 
a signal to the Irish government he wanted to overcome 
and heal those “deep scars” that would engender deeper 
ties between Ireland and Britain. Moreover, his rhetoric 
suggested acknowledging the Potato Famine would sym-
bolically remove an impediment to a deeper Anglo-Irish 
relationship, which could provide the Irish government 
impetus to put pressure on the IRA in Northern Ireland 
to re-start peace negotiations with the British government. 
Additionally, it gave the impression that Mr. Blair’s govern-
ment would be open to consider the grievances of Ireland 
and the people of Northern Ireland in attempting to move 
the peace process forward. Prime Minister Blair’s acknowl-
edgement signaled a new era in Anglo-Irish relations and 
in the continually stalled peace talks in Northern Ireland.
In the next sentence of his statement, Blair employed 
mortification by stating, “those who governed in London 
at the time failed their people through standing by while 
a crop failure turned into a massive human tragedy. We 
must not forget such a dreadful event” (Blair, 1997). Note 
Prime Minister Blair clearly delineated culpability for the 
Potato Famine rested with “those who governed in Lon-
don” at the time. He implicitly took responsibility for the 
results of Ireland’s potato crop failure by noting the British 
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government “failed their people” by “standing by”, doing 
nothing to assist the Irish, which turned into a “massive 
human tragedy” for millions of Irishmen. By taking re-
sponsibility for London’s inaction, Blair symbolically re-
moved the guilt that continued to pollute relations between 
the Ireland and Britain. In doing so, Blair rebalanced and 
repositions Anglo-Irish relations on a more positive foot-
ing because this historical transgression was fully being 
dealt with in the present so it does not impede future ties 
between the two nations. At the same time, Blair’s rhetoric 
suggested he would not be a leader that ignored human 
tragedies, namely the situation within Northern Ireland. 
Hence, Prime Minister Blair’s tenure marked a new chapter 
in the history of Ireland and Britain, one built on mutual 
respect, mutual responsibility, and a future where each na-
tion’s fate was intertwined with the other.
The rest of the Blair’s statement focused on commemo-
rating the efforts of the Irish people in the wake of the Po-
tato Famine. Blair (1997) emphasized:
“It is also right that we should pay tribute to ways in 
which the Irish people have triumphed in the face of 
this catastrophe. Britain in particular has benefited im-
measurably from the skills and talents of Irish people, 
not only in areas such as music, the arts and the caring 
professions but across the whole spectrum of our po-
litical, economic and social life. Let us therefore today 
not only remember those who died but also celebrate 
the resilience and courage of those men and women 
who were able to forge another life outside Ireland, and 
the rich culture and vitality they brought with them. 
Britain, the U.S. and many Commonwealth countries 
are richer for their presence”.
Here, Blair was not commemorating the Potato 
Famine, but the “Irish people” because of their resilience 
through the “face of this catastrophe.” According to Blair, 
Irish men and women have enhanced the larger British 
community across all spectrums of life. They have made 
communities within Britain, the United States, and other 
British Commonwealth countries (Australia, New Zea-
land, and others) “richer for their presence”. Commemorat-
ing and remembering the Irish who not only survived this 
tragedy, but their descendants, in a sense, tells the stories 
of Irish past and present. Blair’s rhetoric appeared to say 
to his Irish audience that despite the difficult Anglo-Irish 
past the Irish deserve equal standing in the history of the 
British Empire. At the time of the Potato Famine Irish were 
constructed as second-class citizens. By acknowledging the 
great work of the Irish in British society Blair suggested he 
wanted to historically revise Ireland’s place within British 
history. Instead of second-class citizens, the Irish deserve 
an exalted place in making the United Kingdom one of 
the “richest and most powerful nations in the world”. This 
rhetoric, we assert, constituted Blair’s corrective action. As 
noted earlier, corrective action typically entails rhetors out-
lining specific concrete steps their nation will take to right 
the past wrongs for survivors of these injustices. However, 
because the Irish potato famine took place 150 years earlier 
there were no direct survivors; no specific reparations to be 
made or laws passed that could correct that wrongdoing. 
At the same time, the Potato Famine left a legacy of ill will 
within Anglo-Irish relations. Blair’s tribute to the Irish peo-
ple, as well as his acknowledgement and mortification con-
cerning the Irish Potato Famine, to rebalance, deepen, and 
strengthen the Anglo-Irish relationship, also positioned 
him to leverage this enhanced relationship to make greater 
progress in the Northern Ireland peace negotiations. 
Although Tony Blair’s apology was quite short, and 
not actually delivered in person, it received considerable 
attention from Irish, British, and international newspapers. 
After looking at over 100 articles on Blair’s Potato Famine 
rhetoric we found specific negative and positive reaction 
to the prime minister’s statement. British historian Law-
rence James argued Blair’s acceptance of responsibility for 
the Potato Famine was just another buy-in to the myth that 
Irish nationalists constructed around this seminal event. 
Rather, he asserted Britain’s inability to assist the Irish 
was due to its belief at the time in “their passionate be-
lief in free trade and market forces”, which led them to be 
“unwilling to spend government money on food for the 
Irish” because they “feared the economic consequences of 
a dependency culture and state aid was discontinued” 
(James, 1997, p. 8). The British government’s response 
was incompetence, not anti-Irish malice. Incompetence, 
according to James, did not deserve an apology. If that was 
the case “then every government in the world would be is-
suing apologies” (James, 1997, p. 8). 
British Unionist leaders in Northern Ireland were 
tougher in reviewing Blair’s discourse. John Taylor and 
Ian Paisley, Jr., prominent Unionist politicians, forecasted 
Blair’s apology would result in “a rash of British acts of 
political contrition to Irish nationalism, scraping apolo-
gies and sickening concessions” (Pauley, 1997, p. 8). John 
Taylor went so far as to claim “the Irish mentality is one 
of victimhood and to ask for one apology one week and 
another on a different subject the next” (Wallen, 1997, 
p. A7). Essentially, those that disagreed with Blair’s rheto-
ric observed there was no need to apologize for something 
that occurred over 150 years ago and any apology would 
only lead to further concessions, which would undercut 
the reconciliation process not enhance it.
Despite this negativity, the Irish and British public’s 
reception from 10 Downing Street was generally positive. 
The Irish government welcomed Blair’s remarks stating, 
“while the statement confronts the past honestly, it does so 
in a way that heals for the future. The Prime Minister is 
to be complimented for the thought and care shown in his 
statement”. Moreover, the American Irish Political Educa-
tion Committee commended the British prime minister for 
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taking responsibility for the Potato Famine. They stated he 
“deserves enormous credit for taking this step” (Fincuane, 
1997, p. 11). Gerry Adams, leader of the Irish Republican 
Army’s political wing Sinn Fein, begrudgingly accepted 
Blair’s contrition (The Australian, 4 June 1997, p. 10). One 
reader of the Irish Times noted “Tony Blair has taken an im-
portant step towards a better relationship between Ireland 
and Great Britain” (Laird, 1997, p. 15). Ultimately, the Irish 
Times observed the prime minister “deserves bouquets for 
the famine apology”, while he “added dignity” to the com-
memoration of the Potato Famine (Holland, 1997, p. 18). 
Considering Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahearn called for 
the British to apologize for the potato famine two years ear-
lier, his government and most Irish press accounts praised 
Blair’s rhetoric we can assume Blair’s contrition made a posi-
tive impression on the Irish government and Irish public.
In Britain, the press generally characterized Blair’s 
apology rhetoric as “significant” and “historic”, which 
would rebalance Anglo-Irish relations as more equita-
ble and put the Northern Ireland peace process back on 
track (Watt, 1997, p. 2). Historian Peter Gray asserted Tony 
Blair’s words, while carefully chosen, should be welcomed 
(Gray, 1997, p. 19). Anthony Cary, a Counselor for the 
British Embassy in Washington D.C., argued Tony Blair’s 
“apology” “is as step towards reconciliation” between Ire-
land and Britain, while laying the groundwork for more 
constructive peace talks in Northern Ireland (Cary, 1997, 
p. A22). Contrary to the nattering nabobs of negativity, 
the majority of press accounts maintained Blair’s rhetoric 
would lead to better relations between Great Britain and 
Ireland, while raising expectations in the Northern Ireland 
peace process. As such, we can state, as it did in Ireland, it 
left a positive impression upon the British public and laid 
important reconciliation groundwork. 
Evidence of this last claim can be found in how the press 
speculated how the apology might influence the Northern 
Ireland peace talks. Within three months of Blair’s apology 
Sinn Fein and Ulster Unionist leaders met for the first time 
at the negotiating table (Deutsche Press Agentur, 23 Sep-
tember 1997). Within four months of Blair’s apology, Brit-
ish newspapers began to speculate Prime Minister Blair 
was going to apologize for Bloody Sunday. Over the course 
of four more months, the British press on no fewer than 
four occasions predicted 10 Downing Street would apolo-
gize for that event (see Cairns, 1997, p. 1; Eastham, 1998, 
p. 1; Macleod & Campbell, 1998, p. 2; Millar, 1997, p. 3). 
Within these press accounts, Blair’s potato famine apology 
was cited as the precedent for this apology and marked a 
turning point in Northern Ireland peace negotiations. As 
it turned out, Tony Blair appointed a commission, headed 
by its top judicial official Lord Widgery, to reassess all of 
the evidence surrounding Bloody Sunday before an official 
apology would occur. Perhaps, it was this gesture of recon-
sidering the evidence over Bloody Sunday that eventually 
led to the Good Friday accords in April 1998, which es-
sentially created a framework for peace within Northern 
Ireland, led the IRA to issue an apology for its atrocities in 
2002, and subsequent apologies by Tony Blair and his suc-
cessors Gordon Brown and David Cameron over incidents 
that occurred in Northern Ireland (Cunningham, 2004). 
It may be difficult to make a specific causal link between 
Prime Minister Blair’s apology and Northern Ireland rec-
onciliation efforts. However, one can certainly assert his 
rhetoric raised expectations for an apology for Bloody 
Sunday (which eventually occurred under Prime Minister 
Cameron). If nothing else it rhetorically set the tone for 
relational dynamics to significantly change in Anglo-Irish 
relations and within the Northern Ireland peace process.
Tony Blair’s apology for the Irish potato famine repre-
sented an important moment in rebalancing Anglo-Irish 
relations, while jumpstarting Northern Ireland peace nego-
tiations. Ultimately, apologies, statements of contrition, re-
gret, reconciliation, forgiveness, and the like, are more likely 
to become commonplace as more societies transition from 
one set of circumstances to another, as well as established 
communities confronting the past so they can maintain, 
deepen, and strengthen the communal bonds amongst its 
citizens. As Hannah Arendt (1963) put it, “every generation, 
by virtue of being born into a historical continuum, is bur-
dened by the sins of the father as it is blessed by the deeds of 
the ancestors” (p. 27). Prime Minister Blair’s attempt to deal 
with one of the sins of its father was not a panacea that wiped 
away the pain, destruction, and loss caused by the British 
callous response to the Potato Famine. However, it did func-
tion to symbolically realign Anglo-Irish relations, signaled 
Blair’s willingness to proceed with peace negotiations in 
Northern Ireland, and created an overall political dynamic 
that broke through years of animosity. Nation-states that are 
in transition or already established would do well in follow-
ing Blair’s example, not necessarily his apology per se, but 
dealing with the “sins of the father” so “deeds of the ances-
tors” can truly be shared by all.  
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